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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
?EUEL s. KOHLER, et al. , 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
GARDEN CITY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BIRDIE PROPERTIES, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
GARDEN CITY, et al. , 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
KOHLER 
Case No. 17346 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/respondents Kohler (hereinafter sometimes the 
"Kohlers") brought this action to quiet title to certain property 
which they own in Garden City against adverse claims of defendant/ 
appellant Garden City (hereinafter sometimes "Garden City") that a 
portion of the Kohlers' property had been impliedly dedicated as a 
public thoroughfare. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court quieted title in favor of the Kohlers and 
awarded them injunctive and monetary relief. 
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Kohlers seek affirmation of the lower court's · J Udo-
ment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Kohlers agree that appellant is a duly incorporated 
town in the State of Utah. The balance of the statement of facts 
set forth by Garden City is argumentative and undocumented. The 
Kohlers submit that the record demonstrates the following. 
In 1967, when the Kohlers purchased their property on tf.e 
shore of Bear Lake in Garden City, they had no knowledge of ~y 
claimed "right-of-way." They did have notice of a foot-path over· 
grown with weeds which was occasionally used by a neighbor who was 
able to drive his jeep down the path for access to his property 
(Transcript, hereinafter "Tr." 46). This foot path, however, was 
located at all times south of the surveyed boundary of the Kohlers' 
property and did not encroach upon their property (Tr. 13, 14, 41). 
The record demonstrates that the Kohlers had no knowledge of a 
claim by Garden City to a right-of-way, at least not until 1972 
when the City widened the foot path to the north causing it to 
cross and encroach upon the southern portion of the Kohler propert) 
(Tr. 56) • The Kohlers were not informed of the extent of Garden 
City's claim until 1974 (Tr. 91). Contrary to appellant's as~r 
ti on, nowhere does the record demonstrate that "its right-of-way" 
was "historically dedicated and established by the original plat 
-2-
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and survey" (Brief of Appellant Garden City (hereinafter "Br." l , 
]). 
Finally, and contrary to Garden City's Statement of 
~cts, the Kohlers do indeed contest the existence and extent of 
~blic assess to Bear Lake from the end of First South in Garden 
dty. This issue always has been and continues to be a major one 
in this lawsit. This entire case hinges upon whether the use of 
~e path in question by the public has been sufficient to consti-
tute an implied dedication under §27-12-89, Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
and, if so, the location and width of the highway so dedicated. 
The trial court found that proof of such use was lacking and 
granted Judgment in favor of the Kohlers (Memorandum Decision, p. 
2). 
ARGUMENT 
I. GARDEN CITY FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF 
ESTABLISHING BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF THAT 
THE KOHLERS' LAND HAD BEEN DEDICATED AS A 
PUBLIC HIGHWAY. 
The burden of a party who appeals the Judgment of a trial 
court and the duty of the reviewing court were described in the 
~e of Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961) as 
follows: 
In considering the attack on the findings 
and judgment of the trial court it is.our duty 
to follow these cardinal rules of review: to 
indulge them a presumption of validity and 
correctness; to require the appellant to.sus-
tain the burden of showing error; to review the 
record in the light most favorable to them; and 
not to disturb them if they find substantial 
support in the evidence. 11 Utah 2d at 390. 
-3-
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See also _R_._C_. _T_o_l_m_a_n __ C_o_n_s_t_r_u'---c-=t--'i_o-=n'---v-'-'-.-..:.cM:..Yc..:t::.:o::.:n:.:_.::W..:::a:..::t:..::e:..;r:_:A:..:.::'.s~s:::-o~c:.::i~ac_:t:.::i~on, 50 
P. 2d 780 (Utah, 1977). If there is a reasonable basis in the evi 
dence to support the trial court's findings, they should not be 
disturbed. Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah, 1976). Indee: 
the findings and Judgment of the trial court are entitled to a 
presumption of correctness and credibility; the appellant must 
clearly demonstrate that they are in error. First Security Bank 1 
Utah, N.A. v. \~right, 521 P.2d 563 (Utah, 1974); Latimer v. Katz, 
29 Utah 2d 280, 508 P.2d 542 (1973). 
Garden City has not alleged that the trial court's ac· 
tions were arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. The only matt~ 
left for review is whether the trial court weighed the evid~~ 
under the appropriate legal standard. Once it is determined tha~ 
the appropriate legal standards were applied, the Judgment must~ 
affirmed. The evidence adduced at trial need be examined only so 
far as necessary to decide whether approporiate legal principals 
were applied. 
The major issues raised by Garden City in its appeal, 
namely, whether a "right-of-way" was extinguished and the width 0 
that right-of-way (Docketing Statement, Issues A and B; Br. Part 
II) beg the entire question on appeal. This case at the trial 
court turned on the question of whether or not such a right-of-wa 
was ever in fact created. · guish· The questions of width and ext1n 
-4-
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'~.ent once a right-of-way is created were not addressed by the trial 
I court nor need they be reached on appeal.* 
' 
Utah law is clear that property may be dedicated to 
?ublic use as a highway in only one of two ways. Property can be 
~.I c~icated expressly or dedication may be implied by public use. In 
[ this case, the City claims no record interest in the land. Thus, 
' if there has been a dedication it must be implied under the stand-
~1 ard articulated in §27-12-89, Utah Code Ann. (1953). That section 
orovide s: 
A highway shall be deemed to have been 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the 
public when it has been continuously used as a 
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
(emphasis added) 
Earlier cases under this and the prior common law rule looked at 
ilie actual intent of the grantor in allowing public use of his 
Ii, property. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hull, et al., 24 P. 799 (1890); 
1 I Whittaker v. Ferguson, 6 Utah 240, 51 P. 980 (1898); Shettler v. 
I Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955 (1901). Later cases have looked at 
the question by more objective standards, but still focus on con-
' duct from which the intent of the grantor in allowing a use of his 
if ~roperty adverse to his interests may be implied. 
* The issues of the creation and width of a public thorough-
~u were recognized and briefed by Garden City after trial (De-
l) fendant' s Post-Trial Memorandum, pp. 2, 3). With regard to the 
~~h of the claimed right-of-way, it is interesting to note that 
Garden City's Counterclaim is silent on the subject of width. 
A.lthough a 9 9 foot dedication had previously been claimed, at trial 
Garden City argued for a 66 foot roadway (Defendant's Post-Trial 
)lemorandum, p. 3) . on appeal, Garden City has elected to renew its 
claim to 99 feet (Br. 6, 15). 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
Because of the pre-eminence of private property rights, I 
Utah case law clearly states that the burden of proof in is on the 
party asserting an implied public dedication. This Court, in 
Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966), stated: 
In connection with this review we deem it 
appropriate to note our agreement that the 
dedication of one's property to a public use 
should not be regarded lightly and that certain 
principles should be adhered to. The presump-
tion is in favor of the property owner; and the 
burden of establishing public use for the re-
quired period of time is on those claiming it. 
(emphasis added; footnote omitted) 
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court 
determination of an implied dedication and stated: 
Irrespective of the departure from theory or 
proof, we think the burden of proving a real 
public use continuously for ten years was not 
met here in light of principles to the effect 
that dedication of rights to the public gener-
ally, must be displayed by clear and convincing 
evidence. This we say in view of the other 
principle that on review we canvass the facts 
in a light more favorable to the conclusion of 
the arbiter of the facts. These principles 
clash somewhat, but where individual property 
rights are at stake we must not treat such 
rights lightly. Petersen v. Combe, 438 P.2d 
545, 546 (Utah, 1968). (emphasis added; foot-
notes omitted) 
Thus, at trial Garden City was required to establish a dedi~ti® 
by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence adduced at trial 
indicates, and the trial court found, that Garden City failed to 
meet its burden. 
The City demonstrated no evidence of use before the 
Kohlers' land was patented by the United States Government. 
-6-
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1 
evidence adduced at trial was predominantly by people who owned 
contiguous property and by their relatives and invitees. There was 
evidence that cattle were occasionally driven down the lane to 
~asture. Several individuals testified that as children they would 
visit their cousins and use the lane for access to the lake in the 
summer and for sledding in the winter. There was evidence of 
occasional use by automobiles, but this again was predominantly by 
adjacent land owners and their relatives and invitees. There was, 
in short, no evidence of continuous use of the lane by the public 
as a thoroughfare for a period of ten years. The City simply did 
not meet its burden of establishing an implied dedication. Indeed, 
the Court found that "if there was any public use to the lake in 
that area that it was a use that was occasional for pedestrian and 
cattle traffic" (Memorandum Decision, p. 2). This finding was 
neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion. 
Equally important is the fact that the lane was at all 
1 times located to the south of the Kohler property. The only survey 
in the record, that of Robert Wilson, a licensed surveyor of emi-
nent qualifications, demonstrates that the road or "foot path" was 
located to the south of the southern boundary of the Kohler prop-
erty when he surveyed it in 1967 (Tr. 7, 8, 13, 14). The lane 
i about which he and other witnesses testified was narrow. The area 
around the lane was swampy and divided from the pasture to the 
north by livestock fences. Even if the evidence could establish an 
implied dedication by the property owner over whose land the lane 
-7-
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ran, that dedication could not operate to dedicate any part of~ 
Kohler land over which the land did not run. It is axiomatic that 
a property owner cannot dedicate by implication that which he cou)' 
not dedicate expressly. Indeed, the court found: 
That any such use in any event was located to 
the south of the southern boundary of the 
Kohler property and no demonstrated use has 
been shown to the satisfaction of the Court of 
property belonging to the Kohlers until the 
encoachment by the City in 1972. (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 2) 
If the City de sires to take land to the north of Kohlers' boundari 
I 
line--land over which no public use occurred prior to 1972--they 
1 
must accord due process of law, condemn the land and compensate it: 1 
owners. 
The Utah Supreme Court case which is most instructive 
here is Petersen v. Combe, supra. As set forth above, this case 
provides the standard of clear and convincing evidence by which a 
dedication must be demonstrated. Petersen involved the alleged 
implied dedication of a dead end road, the property on eit~r ri~1 
of which was owned by various individuals. The Court stated that I 
these individuals, by virtue of their land ownership, were entitle: I 
to use the road and that "they or their personal visitors cannot~/ 
numbered in the class of members of the general public using such 
road in a fashion that might ripen into a dedication of a ro~ 
under the statute." 438 P.2d at 545. The Court further notedtha: 
the road was used by various agencies of government for access to 
the land at the end of the dead end road and that Weber county 
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equipment graded and maintained the road off and on during the 
I period in question. The Court posed this question: 
·1· 
I 
Was there sufficient evidence by competent 
testimony, by witnesses who were not self-
serving, to show by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that the public generally,--not just a 
few having their own special and private inter-
ests in the road, had used the road continu-
ously for ten years? Id. at 546, 547. 
The Court then answered the question in light of the facts adduced 
at trial in the negative. 
The facts in Petersen present some helpful parallels to 
the situation here. Both cases involved evidence of use predomi-
; I nantly by adjacent land owners and their relatives and invitees. 
I 
:1 
In both cases municipal funds were apparently used for some main-
tenance of the roads in question. Petersen, like the instant case, 
involved a dead end road--i t was not a thoroughfare as required by 
the statute. The term "thoroughfare" is defined in Black's Law 
Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition, 1968 at page 1651, as: 
A street or passage through which one can 
fare (travel;) that is, a street or highway 
affording an unobstructed exit at each end into 
another street or public passage. (emphasis in 
original; citing inter alia Morris v. Blunt, 
161 P. 1127 (Utah, 1916). 
The lane in question here is not a "thoroughfare." It does not 
allow an unobstructed exit at each end; it does not provide transit 
between two other lanes or public ways; it does not even connect a 
public highway with any land or facility owned by Garden City. The 
fact that there is no public facility, no beach and no boat ramp, 
means that for the public to use Bear Lake from the right-of-way 
-9-
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claimed by Garden City, the public must trespass on private Prop-
erty to turn vehicles around, to launch boats, to water stock, m 
even swim from the beach. The 66-foot access claimed by the City 
at trial (Post-Trial Memorandum, p. 3) and the 99-foot easement 
claimed on appeal (Br. 6) are still insufficient for these uses 
without the use of private lands not yet claimed by the City. 
The three cases cited by appellant in support of its 
assertion that an implied dedication occurred provide no nourishrre .. / 
for their argument. In all three cases, Shettler v. Lynch, 23 Uta: 
305, 64 P.2d 955 (1901), Wilson v. Hull, 7 Utah 90, 24 P. 799 1rn:I 
and Whittaker v. Ferguson, 6 Utah 240, 51 P. 980 (1898) an "animus I 
dedicandi" or intention to dedicate was found in the land owner 
because of extensive and continuous public use of his land. The 
following distinguishing language from the court in those caRs~ 
instructive: 
• if the land of which that covered by the 
road is a part is unenclosed, and not appropri-
ated to any special use by the owner, the fact 
that the public travels over it occasionally, 
as the custom may be to cross vacant and unoccu-
pied lands without objection from the owner, 
does not authorize any infererence of an inten-
tion to dedicate. Under such circumstances the 
mere failure to manifest an objection does not 
authorize an inference that the mind of the 
owner consents. The inference in that case is 
that the proprietor did not understand that the 
land was being appropriated for the permanent 
use of the public as a highway. Wilson v. Hull, 
24 P. at 800. 
In Shettler v. Lynch, like the current case, the Judge had W 
resolve some conflicts in the evidence. The Supreme court stated, 
in upholding his ruling: 
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I 
It is true, there is some conflict in the evi-
dence relating to the dedication by the owner 
of the land and the acceptance by the public 
and the findings of fact hereinbefore referr~d 
to are thus based upon conflicting evidence, 
but there appears to be a decided preponderance 
of proof in support of them, and therefore this 
court will not disturb them. Likewise as to 
the other findings, and the conclusions of law 
of which the appellants complain. In such a 
case the findings of the trial court will not 
be disturbed unless they are so manifestly 
erroneous as to demonstrate some oversight or 
mistake. 64 P. at 956. 
The case most stressed in Garden City's Brief is that of 
Hunsaker v. State of Utah, 29 Utah 2d 322, 509 P.2d 352 (1973). 
This case is clearly distinguishable from the present case. In 
Hunsaker, the existence of a highway easement across the northern 
portion of plaintiff's land was admitted by all parties. The only 
question was whether that easement was one or two rods wide. The 
trial court held that the highway is presumed to be of the statu-
tory width and that the evidence was not sufficient to rebut that 
( presumption. In the instant case, no continuous public use of the 
land now owned by the Kohlers was shown. Even if a dedication of a 
right-of-way by the land owner to the south is shown, a fortiori 
the entire width of that dedication must have been of his land--the 
only land which he could dedicate. 
More helpful is the case of Bozo v. Ogden City, 285 P. 
1 1033 (Utah, 1930). It might be said that Bozo is the Hunsaker case 
without the existing right-of-way. In Bozo, plaintiffs sued to 
quiet title to the north 4 9 1/2 feet of their property which the 
City claimed was part of a public street known as 20th Street. The 
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T 
trial court found the plaintiffs were owners in fee simple of the 
1 1 
entire tract, including the north 49 1/2 feet, and that the strip 
! t 
of land in dispute had never been opened to the public or used by 
the public for travel, even though a dedication of another 49 l/l 
feet north of plaintiffs' property line had been dedicated as a 
i c 
I 
The streets both west and east of 20th Street were 99 fee·. t 
· 1 
street. 
in width. In light of this evidence, the Utah Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court and held that " [ t] here was no dedication b 1· 
I t 
opening and user" of plaintiffs' property. 285 P. at 1034. Int~ J 
instant case, the evidence demonstrated and the trial court found 
insufficient public use to imply a dedication. Even if such user / 
had been found, the evidence demonstrates that it was of the lane I c 
to the south of Kohlers' property. As in Bozo, a dedication of tk I 
south 49 1/2 feet does not necessitate a dedication of the north 
49 1/2 feet. 
I Garden City also cites the case of Jeremy v. Bertagnole,( 1. 
et al., 101 Utah 1, 116 P.2d 420 (1941). This case involved East I e 
Canyon Road, a 25 mile road from Old Highway 40 (now I-80) to the u 
towns of Morgan and Hennifer. The Supreme Court affirmed the tria:/ 
court's ruling of an implied dedication, citing findings of the 
court that the road was 
a well traveled, worked, and defined public 
road ... that it [was] and had been for 60 
years continuously used by ranchmen, stockmen, 
owners of land contiguous and adjacent thereto 
and by the public generally for all necessary 
and convenient purposes. 101 Utah at 3, 
4 (emphasis added). 
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f 
I ~e court cited further findings by the trial court that the use of 
! the road had been "as general and extensive as though it had been 
formally laid out as a public highway by public authority." 101 
~ah at 4. The Jeremy case is clearly different from the instant 
i case. Jeremy involved a long road connecting a highway with two 
I 
towns; the instant case involves a dead end lane a couple of hund-
red yards long used predominantly by contiguous property owners, 
relatives, invitees and occasional neighbors. The evidence in 
Jeremy demonstrated a continuous commercial use; the evidence in 
ilie present case demonstrates a sporadic use in terms both of 
frequency and purpose. In short, though Jeremy is an instructive 
case and one that is often cited by the Utah courts, it is a far 
I different case than the one at bar. 
Appellant also cites the case of Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 
2d 395, 326 P.2d 107 (1958). Boyer involved "Middle Canyon Road" 
which connected Highway 133 with a town called "Grass Creek." The 
evidence in that case demonstrated a "continuous and uninterrupted 
use of Middle Canyon Road" for the hauling of coal from mines, for 
the driving of cattle and sheep, and for other uses for a period 
exceeding 50 years. 7 Utah 2d at 397. The court noted that the 
public used the road for these purposes in travelling from Grass 
Creek and various other points to and from Highway 133. Again, a 
thoroughfare de scribed in Boyer v. Clark is a completely different 
creature than the dead end lane leading from the end of First South 
in Garden City east to Bear Lake. 
-13-
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! 
The final case cited by appellant on this point, ~' 
Livestock Co. v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353, 259 P.2d 607 (1953) adds 
nothing to appellant's argument. As indicated above, the author;. 
ties cited by Garden City on the question of extinguishment of 
public rights to an established highway are inapposite to this 
discussion. Because no public thoroughfare was found to exist, u,: 
question of extinguishment is moot. 
Again, the case most helpful and instructive here is thi: 
of Petersen v. Combe, supra. The learning of that case compels~ ! 
affirmation of Judge Christofferson's ruling. 
II. EXHIBIT 59, A MAP OFFERED BY GARDEN CITY 
WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED. 
Garden City objects to the exclusion by the trial court 
of its offerred Exhibit 59, a map of Garden City. Contrary to 
Garden City's statement, there is no evidence that the map was 
prepared "at the behest of the town fathers" of Garden City (Br. I 
4), or that it "showed the intent of the town fathers ... andt~ 
I 
actions and reliance of the community" (Br. 6) . The map was ex· I 
eluded for lack of foundation (Tr. 259, 260). Indeed, Mr. Low, r 
counsel for Garden City, admitted that there was no foundation as 
to who originated the map, whether it had any official standing, 
whether it was a public record, or whether it was made pursuant ti 
deed descriptions (Tr. 260, 261). 
In spite of this clear ruling, Garden City argues that 
the document should have been admitted under an exception to the 
-14-
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hearsay rule--Rule 63 (27) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. This 
assertion ignores the fact that hearsay was not an objection raised 
at trial nor was it the basis for the Judge's ruling. 
Alternatively, Garden City argues that the document 
should have been admitted under Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Evi-
aence. Under this rule, an "ancient writing" may be authenticated 
and received into evidence 
if the judge finds that a ruling (a) is at 
least 30 years old at the time it is offered, 
and (b) is in such condition as to create no 
suspicion concerning its authenticity, and (c) 
at the time of its discovery was in a place in 
which such a document, if authentic, would 
likely be found, it is sufficiently authenti-
cated. 
Although there was testimony that the document is in excess of 30 
years old, there was no evidence or finding by the court as to 
where the document was discovered and the fact that it had been 
"all over the country" makes it inherently suspicious (Tr. 256). 
The real difficulty with Garden City's assertion that the 
map should have been admitted as an ancient document is the fact 
that it was never offered as such. The document was excluded for 
lack of foundation and no alternative ground for admission was 
proferred. In his treatise on evidence, Professor McCormick has 
stated: 
If counsel specifies a purpose for which 
the proposed evidence is inadmissible and the 
judge excludes, counsel cannot complain of the 
ruling on appeal though it could have been . 
rightly admitted for another purpose. McCormick 
on Evidence, West Publishing Company, 1972, p. 
112. 
-15-
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If counsel had an alternative basis for admission of his proposed 
exhibit, yet did not allow the judge to consider that ground, ~ 
cannot be heard now to complain of error in exclusion of the a~~ 
ment. 
The authorities cited by Garden City in support of its 
argument on this point do not support its position. The first, 8~ 
A.L.R.2d 915, treats only the competency as evidence of receipts o' 
a third person given for money payment. 80 A.L.R.2d at 917. The 
second, 46 A.L.R.2d 1318 (erroneously cited in Garden City's Brief 
as 46A A.L.R.2d 31318) states point-blank: "An ancient map made 
under the direction of a private person, or one for which no offi· 
cial authorization or recognition appears, is inadmissible in 
evidence." 46 A.L.R.2d at 1333 (emphasis added). A more succinct 
exposition of the Kohlers' position on this document could hardly 
be found. 
Utah case law is clear that there is a presumption in 
favor of the rulings of the trial court, including all aspects of 
the proceedings. This Court has noted such a presumption and 
stated: 
Upon appeal, appellant has the burden of show-
ing that there was substantial and prejudicial 
error which had the effect of depriving him of 
the opportunity of a full and fair presentation 
and consideration of the disputed issues. 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. 
Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah, 1974). 
Thus, Garden City must demonstrate not only that the trial court 
,I 
erred, but that such error was substantial and prejudicial. Inde1:, 
-16-
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this court has stated that "on appeal, the burden is on the appel-
lant to convince us that the trial court committed error and not 
that the appellant should have won the case." Brigham v. Moon Lake 
Electric Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 297, 470 P.2d 393 (1970). 
rudge Christofferson's ruling cannot be reversed for error in the 
exclusion of evidence unless that error was prejudicial (Rule 5, 
Utah Rules of Evidence; Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
oowey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah, 
1978) • 
An examination of the record in this case demonstrates 
that exclusion of the map, even if error, was harmless to Garden 
City's case. The map was not offered to set a new factual base or 
to demonstrate facts that otherwise would not have been in evidence. 
Rather, Mr. Low, Garden City's attorney, offered the map "to corres-
?Ond and corroborate [LaVon Sprouse' s] testimony" (Tr. 261). The 
court states in its Memorandum Decision that the testimony of the 
witnesses was considered in arriving at its conclusion. Nowhere in 
the record is it indicated that the admission of one more map would 
have made any difference. Finally, even if the map did demonstrate 
the "intent of the town fathers" as argued by Garden City, that 
intent is irrelevant as the cases cited herein and in appellant's 
Brief amply demonstrate that it is the land owners' intent, either 
express or implied, from which a dedication must be found. 
-17-
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III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED INJUNC-
TIVE AND MONETARY RELIEF. 
Garden City noted at trial that the court had granted t 
Kohlers' Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint. This Complain: 
set forth additional i terns of damage occuring after the original 
Complaint had been filed. Garden City then indicated that it~( 
request an opportunity to rebut the evidence relative to these ne·, 
elements of damage. The court replied "We' 11 make that determina· 
tion, of course, when you see what the evidence is as to damages, 
and if you need additional time, we'll grant it." The Judge then 
indicated that Garden City would "have the opportunity after hear· 
ing the testimony, if they feel they need the time to rebut it" ! 
(Tr. 4, emphasis added). The elements of damage presented by the 
Kohlers at trial were only those claimed in the original Complain:! 
and did not reflect the additional bases for damages claimed in tli 
I 
Supplemental Complaint. Garden City offered no evidence on the ! 
question of damages nor did it take exception to or object W~ 
proof offered by the Kohlers. Garden City did not request addi· 
tional time or an opportunity to rebut the evidence introduced by' 
the Kohlers. Such an opportunity was available at the time the 
briefing schedule was discussed at the end of the trial (Tr. 
264-267). 
It has never been the understanding of counsel for p1air· 
tiffs that a subsequent hearing would be held to determine the 
issue of damages. Such additional time was to be available to 
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n'. 
~rden City only if they felt surprised by proof of damages under 
the new claims made in the Supplemental Complaint filed on the eve 
of trial. This apparently was also the understanding of the court 
as it proceeded to award Kohlers injunctive and monetary relief in 
the Memorandum Decision of June 30, 1980. Not only did Garden City 
)L:! 
fail to request an opportunity to rebut the evidence on damages, at 
IE', 
no time did it seek relief from or an amendment of the Judgment as 
ia· 
it might have under Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The two cases cited by Garden City, Bobo v. Bigbee, 548 
r· 
! P.2d 224 (Okla. 1976) and Hurley v. Hurley, 127 P.2d 147 (Okla. 
1942) are again not helpful on the point pressed by Garden City. 
In Bobo a motion for a new trial was filed between the time of 
n:I trial and the entry of Judgment. No such motion was filed by 
tt:i 
I Garden City in the instant case. In Hurley, the order at issue on 
! 
appeal did not purport to be a final judgment and expressly left 
open and reserved for further consideration and decision the right 
·complained of. In the instant case, Judge Christofferson' s deci-
sion and subsequent Judgment determined the rights to the parties 
on both sides of the lawsuit and resolved all issues raised by the 
I 
10e~ings. The resolution of the damage question in this case is 
thus not one about which Garden City may claim error. Indeed, 
Garden City has candidly acknowledged that this issue, if the only 
one presented, would not be pursued on appeal (Response to Motion 
for Summary Disposition, p. 3) • 
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CONCLUSION 
It was demonstrated at trial that insufficient continue. 
public use of the lane in question had occurred to imply a ~fil~ 
tion under §27-12-89, Utah Code Ann. (1953). Likewise, it was 
demonstrated that the lane in question, prior to 1972, lay to tilt! 
1 
south of the south boundary of Kohlers' property. The Memoranduri 
Decision entered by the Court found in favor of the Kohlers on 1x) 
points. The rulings on both points are reasonable and find subst i 
tial support in the evidence. 
Garden City has not demonstrated that Judge Christofferj 
I 
was arbitrary or that he abused his discretion. Likewise, tl~ 1 
have demonstrated no error which would act to their substantial I 
I 
prejudice. On the basis of the record in this case and the argu·I 
ments made above, it is respectfully submitted that the Judgment1 
the trial court awarding injunctive and monetary relief to the i 
! 
Kohlers must be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
I £../A- I 
this ~day of January, 1981.i 
i c;:;Q~ 
Edwin c. Barnes 
CLYDE I PRATT I GIBBS & CAHOON I 
Bryce E. Roe 
David E. Leta 
ROE & FOWLER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Respondents Kohler 
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